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2 
The lingua franca of Nominalism 
Sellars on Leibniz 
 
Antonio M. Nunziante  
 
Introduction 
In Sellars’s interpretation of Leibniz we can identify two quite distinct, albeit internally 
linked, fields of inquiry: the first focuses on some technical questions of logic and philosophy of 
language; the second on some broader questions of epistemology, ontology and history of phi-
losophy. In the first case, reference to Leibniz is helpful for disambiguating some internal topics 
of analytical metaphysics. By investigating notions such as “particulars”, “proper names” and 
“abstract entities”, Sellars, in fact, takes a stand against a contemporary debate initially triggered 
by Bertrand Russell, which counted Nelson Goodman, Peter Strawson and Gustav Bergmann as 
its closest referents (Rauzy 2009, 87). Such line of inquiry was developed in works like On the 
Logic of Complex Particulars (LCP, 1949), Particulars (P, 1952), Meditations Leibnitziennes 
(ML, 1959) and Abstract Entities (AE, 1963). In the second case, the framework of reference 
consists of some peculiar themes in Leibniz’s philosophy, such as his theory of relations, his rep-
resentational theory of mind, and the definition of truth within his overall nominalist strategy. 
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Sellars focuses on some specifc epistemological and ontological issues that influenced much of 
the modern epistemological tradition, recalling authors such as Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and, 
above all, Kant. He refers directly to these leibnitian topics in ML, but other, more indirect refer-
ences can be found in works like Some Remarks on Kant’s Theory of Experience (KTE, 1967), 
Science and Metaphysics (SM, 1968), Berkeley and Descartes (BD, 1977), and in the seminars 
on pre–Kantian and Kantian topics (KPT). 
The first line of inquiry has been analyzed by Jean–Baptiste Rauzy, who has convincingly 
shown how Sellars connected the controversy on “particulars” to Leibniz, as well as to Berg-
mann’s re–reading of Russell (Rauzy 2009, 94).1 This very solid work has the merit of demon-
strating how the broad topic of universals was linked in Sellars’s early writings to the more tech-
nical, and seemingly remote, issue of the nature of particulars. The second line of inquiry still 
remains to be thoroughly investigated, since Sellars’s interpretation of Early modern epistemolo-
gy was conducted by scholars almost exclusively in relation to Descartes (Alanen 1992), Hume 
(Landy, 2008) and Kant in particular (Macbeth 2000, McDowell 2006, O’Shea 2011, 2016, 2017, 
Haag 2017, Brandom 2015, 2017).  The present paper aims to fill this gap to some degree. I will 
therefore not refer to the issues already analyzed by Rauzy (unless it is strictly necessary), and 
will focus instead on the previously mentioned epistemological and ontological topics. Signifi-
cantly, Sellars claimed in his Introductory Remarks to the Class (KPT 2) that “One of the most 
interesting topics a person wants to work on is the relation of certain features of Kant's thought to 
the corresponding features of Leibniz's thought”. Paraphrasing his words, we could perhaps say  
that one of the most interesting topics a person could work on is the relation of certain features of 
Sellars’s thought to the corresponding features of Kant’s and Leibniz’s thought.  
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1. 
Taking some first steps along the path of Sellars’s interpretation of Leibniz, we can start 
with how he interprets the doctrine of the complete concept.2 Sellars begins by referring to the 
classic quotation from section eight of the Discourse on Metaphysics: 
 
It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to a single subject and this sub-
ject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance; but this is not sufficient, 
and such explanation is merely nominal. We must therefore consider what it is to be at-
tributed truly to a certain subject. Now it is evident that all true predication has some basis 
in the nature of things and that, when a proposition is not an identity, that is, when the 
predicate is not explicitly contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually. That 
is what the philosophers call in–esse, when they say that the predicate is in the subject. 
(Philosophical Essays, 40-41) 
 
In ML Sellars begins to disambiguate the notion of individual concept by using two kinds 
of conceptual tools, which will gradually become more and more entwined. The first concerns 
the question of proper names: the individual concept nominates the individual - not in the sense 
that we, finite subjects, nominate a possible individual, but rather in the sense in which God 
gives a proper name to each individual in the very act of creation (ML, 153-154). The second 
conceptual tool focuses instead on the distinction between concept and nature, specifying that the 
individual concept has a double level of existence: it exists in the divine’s understanding as a log-
ical concept, and in re as the nature of a substance (ML, 154). Individuals are conceived in modal 
terms (as mere logical possibilities of the divine’s mind) on the one hand, while on the other they 
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are factually considered as natural substances existing in the world. 
Sellars says that the “venerable” notion of individual nature thus took a new twist in Leib-
niz’s hands, since he was the first  
 
to see clearly that the individuality of a substance can only be understood in terms of epi-
sodes in its history, and to conclude that if the nature of a substance is to account for its in-
dividuality, it must account for episodes, and not merely the capacities, powers, disposi-
tions […] which were traditionally connected with the natures of things” (ML, 154). 
 
Accordingly, the nature of a substance indicates more than just a dispositional property (as 
traditionally claimed by the post–Aristotelian tradition - APM, 545; Rauzy 2009, 93), but Leibniz 
reworks it better in terms of conditional episodes. He says that the nature of an individual sub-
stance, if we but knew it, would explain why an individual “behaves as it does in the circum-
stances in which it is placed” (ML, 154). The nature of a substance somehow captures all the epi-
sodic premises that lie behind the behavior of a given individual. In this context, Sellars applies 
to Leibniz a logical model drawn from C.D. Broad, which enables episodes to be interpreted as 
conditional premises of a series, such that “if at any time S were to be involved in an episode of 
kind E1, it would be involved in an episode of kind E2” (ML, 154). Sellars thus describes Leib-
niz’s concept of nature by logically appealing to a whole series of conditionals that, chained to-
gether, form the premise “of a syllogism in re” (ML, 155; Rauzy 2009, 93). 
The result produces a sort of modal stress, however, because - as Sellars points out - Leib-
niz conflates two different models here: he uses the so–called “thing–nature” framework of the 
Aristotelian tradition on the one hand, while on the other he refers to the “event–law” framework 
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that dominated the lexicon of science from the 17th century onwards (APM, 546, 565-566). The 
first model, more closely reflecting common sense, assumes that some natural kinds of things 
exist, grow and develop according to an internal framework. It consequently admits the (ontolog-
ical) presence of substantial forms representing the metaphysical core of each substance. By con-
trast, instead of referring immediately to “things”, the second model focuses specifically on the 
lawful dimension of nature: scientists do not know what kinds of things are there until they arrive 
at laws “which can be translated into the thing language” (APM, 566). In this case, it is the no-
mological element that determines what properties are needed in order to be “a thing” (res), so 
we are no longer speaking of a substance, but rather of  “events”. The latter indicates a sort of 
relational structures that does not spring from a central core, but consists in a process of recipro-
cal functional correlations. 
Returning to Leibniz, the nature of a substance would therefore occupy an amphibious po-
sition, since it would contain both episodic facts (in accordance with the thing–nature framework 
of the Aristotelian tradition) and hypothetical facts conforming to the modern event–law lexicon. 
Indeed, given the operational presence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, episodes prove to be 
reducible into hypotheticals, so the first model can be collapsed into the second (ML, 156).3 In-
dividual substances are therefore the outcome of a strange twist taken by Leibniz, and Sellars 
argues that the source of this conceptual mélange should be sought in his remote doctrine of rela-
tions. The Aristotelian realistic conception of relations met with some well–known difficulties in 
explaining the connection between particulars and universals, as Sellars recalls. Leibniz, for his 
part, worked within this late–Aristotelian context. Renewing the lexicon of inherence (accidents 
that inhere to matter), he established a new epistemic status for relations (KPT, 257), in what 
Sellars judges a “brilliant metaphysical move”. This, in turn, produced a kind of snowball effect 
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as it soon changed the traditional approach to the very concept of “truth” and the modern concept 
of “representation”.  More generally, it reshaped some of the most solid epistemic principles of 
Early Modern times (like the general distinction between “subject” and “object”), giving new 
power to a pure nominalist position. 
 
2. 
At the beginning of the previously–quoted passage, Leibniz said that “when several predi-
cates are attributed to a single subject and this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an in-
dividual substance”. He promptly added, however, that this is not enough, because such an ex-
planation is “merely nominal”. So we need to investigate what it is to be “attributed truly” to a 
certain subject. What seems to interest Sellars is the term “attribute”, and in particular the fact 
that attributes cannot be conceived as abstract entities (KPT, 249). Sellars says we are not dealing 
with linguistic facts, since the context has a rather theological background, referring to God’s 
knowledge of individuals. The idea is, more or less, that statements like “Socrates is wise” are 
only true if the attribute of being wise is a constitutive element of the corresponding judgment 
pronounced by God (KPT, 250). Hypothetically, wisdom might even not figure among our crite-
ria for identifying Socrates (as it was for many of his Athenian peers), because what really mat-
ters is the “basis in the nature of things”. It is only in divine judgments that predicates are neces-
sarily involved in the subject and therefore metaphysically true. 
The same topic can be considered from a different point of view, focusing on the problem 
of relations: if the nature of Socrates involves everything that is true of him, then it will also be 
true of him that, at some time in his life, he stood on the Agora. In this case, we have to consider 
how a spatial relation (being on the Agora) can be true of Socrates, and how it can be included in 
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his nature (KPT, 252). We can tell in advance where the whole argument is leading: relations (of 
any kind) have a mere phenomenic nature, insofar as they can be considered as predicates that 
inhere to a subject, and they are eventually transformed by Leibniz into representative states of 
individual substances (monads). But what we need to understand is precisely what this means. 
One important element to consider is the historical distinction drawn by Descartes between 
“formal” and “objective” reality. In an act–content model of representation, Sellars argues, we 
have to distinguish between two ways of being. There is a “second class of existence”, in which 
the content depends entirely on the act of representing (“objective” existence); and there is a 
“first class of existence”, in which being is not dependent on a mental act (“formal” or “actual” 
existence - KPT, 9). There are consequently also two kinds of truth. There are things that are 
metaphysically true, in the sense that they actually have a kind of existence; but there are also 
second–class truths concerning represented objects, which are considered true only by virtue of 
the fact that they correspond to some entities in the first class. Sellars attributes the utmost im-
portance to this distinction in many of his writings. In his view, it represents “the whole key of 
the epistemology of this period”, for here we have the primary source of “a correspondence theo-
ry of experience” (KPT, 8-9).4 
Leibniz’s theory of relations does indeed seem to develop along the lines of a correspond-
ence theory of truth, though this is actually undermined from within because he completely re-
writes notions like “correspondence” or “counterpart” (as does Kant later on). While for Des-
cartes and Newton, actual things are those existing in the absolute dimension of space and time, 
for Leibniz every sort of relational structure can have no such existence, but must always inhere 
to a substance. Space and time have no actual existence, only an objective one. The fact that the 
individual S1 represents a triangle does not mean that a real triangle “absolutely” exists. Des-
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cartes might have endorsed it, but for Leibniz (and later for Kant) there can be no actual space 
because the whole point is to determine precisely what it means to be “actual” (KPT, 253). Ac-
cording to Leibniz, the idea of an extended universe being formally there makes no sense. As a 
matter of fact, a radical schism gave rise to the Early Modern age: for the Cartesians and Newto-
nians, as well as for most of the empiricist tradition, the physical universe has an eminently 
mind–independent space–time existence. Leibniz had another kind of intuition, which was quite 
the opposite: the notion of a stand–alone universe would make no sense without the actual pres-
ence of individuals endowed with perception, so the objective existence of the former can be 
considered as part of the formal representative character of the latter. The physical universe is not 
self–contained, but compatible and integrated with a system of actual representing subjects.5 
This brings us, of course, to the very core of Leibniz’s nominalism. In a metaphysical 
sense, only substances (and their properties) exist: “Indeed, considering the matter carefully, we 
must say that there is nothing in things, but simple substances, and in them, perception and appe-
tite (Philosophical Essays, 181)”.6 The consequences are clearly enormous because the very idea 
of “objective” existence (like the space–time primary dimension) is called into question. Only 
representing substances are actual, while the physical universe (with its space–time relations) 
becomes an objectively represented world.  Leibniz stretches the old Cartesian distinction be-
tween “formal” and “objective” existence to its limits, and Sellars is keen to remind us that, if we 
do not take this idea seriously, then “Leibniz doesn’t exist at all” (KPT, 253). He adds that Kant 
will suffer the same fate because he packs “a new meaning into the word actual” in his Critique, 
and he is indeed “very close to Leibniz” (KPT, 253-254). Briefly put, the very idea of “actuality” 
was reshaped (albeit in different ways) by Leibniz and Kant, and that is why they were both 
driven to explore a new meaning for the expression “being true”. The sense of the old dictum 
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adaequatio mentis et rei now lacked the material counterpart that consists, according to the Car-
tesian and Newtonian traditions, in the absolute spatiality of bodies. 
To clarify this main idea, which marked a pivotal turning point in the epistemology of the 
Modern age, Sellars proposes to approach the issue from a different angle. If we imagine a sys-
tem of three monadic individuals, S1, S2 and S3, we can try to understand how the phenomenal 
domain of space is engendered by their representations. In outer space, Sellars says, “an object is 
between object and object”, meaning that spatial relations essentially involve ongoing continuity 
(“something being beyond something”). The object in question occupies a certain region in 
space, which is further determined by its relation to another region in space, and so on (KPT, 
254-255). In our tiny monadic system, we thus have three monads that are not spatially related, 
but they are capable of representative states. As Sellars suggests, let us suppose that the monad 
S2 represents S1, with the result that S1 will objectively exist in S2 (being represented therein). If 
we also suppose that S1 represents S3 (considering such representing acts in the broad terms of 
what Leibniz would call petites perceptions), then S2 not only represents S1 but also (albeit un-
wittingly) represents the state of S1 that represents S3. To comment on this situation, we can say 
that S2 has a first–order representation of S1 and a second–order representation of S3; or that S2 
represents S1 directly and S3 indirectly (KPT, 255). Needless to say, the game can go on and on, 
in a process based on the idea that every monad always represents every other monad, as well as 
every state of every other monad. 
 
In other words, Leibniz thinks that our petites perceptions are infinitely complex, not just 
in the sense that there are infinitely many of them, but that they are complex in an inter-
esting dimension that is usually overlooked: they are infinitely complex in this ‘nested-
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ness’ as I put it. (KPT, 255)7 
 
What emerges from this continuous process of internal representative mediation is that the 
phenomenic experience of “something that is beyond something” is grounded in the indirect na-
ture of a substance’s representation. “That is all I’m driving at”, Sellars concludes, emphasizing 
the structural similarity between such a “nesting of representations” and the corresponding spa-
tial “beyondness”.8 The metaphysical key to the story is thus as follows: Leibniz begins by de-
scribing what we ordinarily regard as a real relation between objects, then turns it into an ideal 
factor that must be explained in terms of the nature of the perceiving substance. Notions like 
“truth” and “existence” hover there too, insofar as they are implicit in his commitment to a 
strong form of nominalism that we will try to develop later on. 
Now the main question becomes: why did Leibniz question the idea that objects have spa-
tial relationships instead of leaving things as they stood? Sellars suggests that the origin of his 
very counter–intuitive solution was rooted in classical puzzles concerning the (mainly Aristoteli-
an) concept of substance, particularly those treating the relationships between substances and ac-
cidents. To say “this leaf is green”, for instance, was classically regarded as an example of the 
inherent relation between substance and accident, which posed the tough problem of how to in-
terpret the relationship between the particular green of a single leaf and “greenness” in general. 
The problem can be better defined, says Sellars, if we think of two leaves sharing the same shade 
of green (like a “Forest Green, Pittsburgh Paint #59”): do each of the two substances possess 
their own green, or should we assume that there is only one “Forest–Green–59” instantiated by 
two different substances? Here we come up against the classical contrast between the idea of an 
individual qualitative identity and the notion of a numerically identical universal (KPT, 258). 
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Leibniz’s insight, at least according to Sellars’s reconstruction of it, was more or less as 
follows: relational predicates can be expressed in the general form of: 
 
S1 is R to S2 
 
Hence the puzzle of exactly where R should be placed, because it can go on the side of S1 (con-
sidering R as part of it), or on the side of S2, or we can even imagine that R inheres to both terms 
or to neither of them. Leibniz instead took the view that such a proposition should be treated as a 
special case of: 
 
S  is P 
 
and thus 
 
S1 is R–to–S 
               (P) 
 
Leibniz supported the idea that an R–to–S2 predicate is inherent in S1. So he accepted the conse-
quence that S2 must be in S1 (inesse) and, as Sellars points out, he reinterpreted such commit-
ments in the light of the Cartesian distinction between “objective” and “actual” being (ML, 159). 
He therefore interpreted facts in the form of 
 
S1 is R to S2 
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as facts in the form of 
 
S1 represents S2.  
 
Once again, relations are transformed into representative states of a formally existing sub-
stance. The relational fact is but a well–founded phenomenon, the objective existence of which 
has nothing to do with the idea of the naive realism mainly accepted by the empiricists. From a 
realistic stance, there is a kind of extra–epistemic fact (“being green”) that exists in itself, irre-
spective of the current representative status of S1.
9 Leibniz’s extreme nominalist position was 
intended precisely as a way to escape from both naive realism and abstract Platonism. Once and 
for all, “there is nothing in things except simple substances, and in them perception and appe-
tite”. The key is understanding the structure of the inner nature of substances. 
 
3. 
Needless to say, Sellars was strongly in favor of a theoretical shift that enabled relations to 
be transformed into categorical facts (remember The logic of “looks” or The logic of “means” in 
EPM)10 In fact, one of the most interesting possible applications of this approach regards causali-
ty. In Leibniz’s world, facts in the form of 
 
S2 is acted on by S1 (i.e., by being in a state f, S1 causes S2 to become p) (ML, 160) 
 
easily become facts taking the form 
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S2 represents the fact that S1 is in the state f 
 
and thus 
 
S2 represents S1 
 
The notion of causality is therefore revised on the basis of the Cartesian distinction be-
tween objective and formal being. Like relations, causes are merely represented, not represent-
ing. Leibniz’s universe is composed of individual substances, and the worldly things they run 
into during their life–span must be seen as part of their personal story, as the representative stuff 
making up the fabric of their nature. This view, however, brings us back to a problem considered 
earlier. Assuming that Leibniz has effectively turned causes and relationships into ideal represen-
tations, how do we envision the bond that collectively holds together the representative states of 
a substance? How should we interpret the nature of this bond?  Why, Sellars asks, should we not 
continue alongside Broad in interpreting episodic facts in terms of hypothetical facts, taking for 
granted “that both episodes and hypotheticals are grounded in Necessary Being?” (ML, 162). 
The starting point of the problem, we remember, was: “if at any time S were to be involved in an 
episode of kind E1, it would be involved in an episode of kind E2”. According to Sellars, Leibniz 
would not have been wholly comfortable with such a conclusion because of the metaphysical 
premises of his system. Nowadays, we tend to think along the lines of a distinction between 
causal properties (as general hypotheticals) and occurrent states (as categoricals), but Leibniz - 
like most of his predecessors - interpreted causal properties in terms of “desires, plans, personal 
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commitments”. 
 
Thus, whereas we might be inclined to interpret the statement ‘Jones has a strong 
desire to go to New York’ in terms of conditional facts about Jones, Leibnitz thinks of a 
strong desire as a continuing series of episodes which tends to develop into going to New 
York and will continue to develop if not impeded (ML, 162). 
 
Leibniz sees S2 becoming p as a matter of S2 having a plan to become p. In other words, he 
interprets the “becoming” as a sort of actually “doing” something, so though the “plan” to be-
come p may be hypothetical, it is nonetheless interpreted as a categorical fact regarding S2. We 
can hardly avoid referring here to the pivotal part played by the distinction that Sellars himself 
drew between the “ought to do” and the “ought to be” rules in the construction of his own nomi-
nalist position, but there is nonetheless a sense, according to Leibniz’s own position, that “all the 
fundamental facts about a substance are episodic facts” (ML, 162).11 The consequences are huge, 
since “nature” no longer indicates a law–like hypothetical function (as would seem obvious to 
us), but rather a “life–plan”, and “as such it has esse intentionale as the content of an abiding as-
piration” (ML, 162). Broad’s hypothetical law–like notion is ultimately replaced by a concept of 
nature as “something that is always there” (KPT, 252) and wholly involved in every single epi-
sode in the life of an individual substance. Sellars uses the sentence “Socrates is wise” as an ex-
ample of a statement that helps us to see that “wisdom” is not a momentary state of Socrates, but 
an enduring trait that is somehow “a characteristic of this life plan” (KPT, 252). 
To sum up this line of reasoning we can say that the individuality of a substance is identi-
fied by the complete concept; the latter is explained as the sum of the representative states of the 
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former; every single representative episode is logically described by the nature of the substance 
(i.e. by the presence of a life–plan that acts as a self–governed source of justification); the epis-
temic status of relations is founded on metaphysical, and therefore not relational, grounds (the 
divine’s decision to create a world of multiple, mutually–compatible individuals); finally, causes 
and relations are reduced to representative states of the subject and, as such, they are treated like 
predicates that inhere to a substance (praedicatum inest subjecto) and, once again, to its nature. 
The circle is almost complete. What is still missing is a key term that we now need to analyze 
because, in some ways, it provides the ultimate sense of Sellars’s interpretation of Leibniz. Of 
course, the term in question is “truth”. 
 
4. 
Leibniz’s thesis of the inesse is supported by several considerations regarding the nature of 
truth. The issue can first be summarized as follows: the representative, temporally–tensed, epi-
sodes of a substance conform to a corresponding set of timeless facts in the mind of God. Adopt-
ing a correspondence theory of truth, a given representative episode R1 is true if and only if it 
corresponds to a timeless fact F1 that represents the real counterpart of R1 in the mind of God. A 
statement like this calls into question both the notion of truth and the concept of time. As Sellars 
points out, we can say of an episode it took place, is taking place, or will take place, but a fact is 
a fact: it is a fact that 2+2=4, and it makes no sense to say that 2+2 was 4 or that it will be 4 (ML, 
163).  In some contexts at least, “being a fact” is a timeless mode of being. In Sellars’s view, 
Leibniz assumes that 
 
there is a timeless set of entities (i.e., facts) which are about what happens to a substance 
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at different times, and such that it is by virtue of corresponding to these entities that our 
statements and judgments about the substance are true (ML, 163). 
 
The plot for this “ontology of truth” is quite difficult to unfold, however, since Leibniz, in 
Sellars’s view, conflated the notion of timeless fact and the notion of life–plan. He, in fact, as-
sumed the very first notion as the actual guidance of his thought and as a consequence a sort of 
internal pressure was generated in his whole system (ML, 164). The core question thus becomes: 
what does it mean to be a “fact”? Leaving aside all the surrounding statements, it is Sellars him-
self who champions an “over–simplified thesis”, according to which claims of the form: 
 
It is a fact that–p 
 
are simply another way of saying 
 
“P” is a true statement in our language (ML,167). 
 
The purported idea here is that the element of truthfulness lies not in a kind of supporting extra–
linguistic factor (as in the most classic correspondence theory of truth) but in the intrinsic coher-
ence that ties some statements in our language together. In Sellars’s opinion, this whole issue is 
pivotal and also calls Kant into question, because in both cases it seems possible to detect a pecu-
liar form of coherentism proposed as the ground floor of truth. So, before proceeding with Leib-
niz, let us take a brief look at Kant’s own insights. 
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5. 
According to Sellars, correspondence theories of truth, in the Early Modern age at least, 
have been mainly grounded on a representational model of knowledge (KPT, 8). Employing a 
lexicon that refers to the classical quasi–Cartesian epistemological framework, Sellars claims 
that, in considering such theories, we have to be very careful to distinguish between: (i) the “act” 
of representing performed by the subject; (ii) the objective “content” of the intended representa-
tion; and (iii) the real object in the outer space–time world.12 We thus have the individual’s actual 
thoughts (“representings”), some represented content (“represented”), and transcendent real ob-
jects (“unrepresented representings”) that together constitute the ur–type of a relational model of 
knowledge, which Sellars calls “the Cheshire cat form” of relation (KPT, 12).13  
On several occasions Sellars emphasizes that here we are only dealing with an illusory 
form of relation because, on the basis of the content represented, we would be led to imagine a 
one–to–one correspondence between the immanent represented content and the transcendent ob-
ject of the real world. Yet, this is the weak point of the model, since the only real relationship en-
tertained is the one occurring between the act of representing and the immanent represented con-
tent, not the one between represented contents and transcendent objects. The claim that we can 
immediately relate our knowledge to things in themselves raises the prospect of a “transcenden-
tal realism” that Kant himself helps us to unveil (KPT, 25; SM 47).14 Transcendental realists are 
those who mistake the epistemic conditions of our referring to objects (like space and time) for 
properties of things in themselves. What has only epistemic value is assumed instead to be a 
transcendent object. In other words, the “an sich” world would be the ultimate ground of 
givenness and would provide the possibility for a truthful theory of correspondence. 
Sellars’s insight is that at the bottom of such relational structure lies the attempt to offer a 
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plausible explanation for the case of intersubjectively shared representations. If we consider two 
people sharing the same representative content, we are almost compelled to imagine that they 
both refer to a common item of experience, given independently from any form of subjective 
representation. Furthermore, according to the Cartesian tradition, the existence of such independ-
ent content would reflect God’s representation of it in his divine mind (KPT, 20). So we have the 
represented item, the real–worldly objects, and the archetypal items in the mind of God.  This 
complex theory of transcendence later on evolves into what Sellars calls a “theological concep-
tualism”, the most famous interpreter of which was Kant himself (KPT, 36). Indeed leaving aside 
the theological premises of the Cartesian discourse, the idea that the very possibility of represent-
ing an object has to do with the existence of a certain domain of “representables” can still be 
found in Kant: “in a certain sense, there must be a domain of representables, qua representables, 
and among them is, for example, a triangle (KPT, 19).”15 
Kant needs this sort of assumption to break the private dimension of the subject, since rep-
resentables are conceived of as a public domain, as a public source of possible knowledge. We 
need to bear in mind that, in Kantian terms, the argument does not claim that there is a class of 
representables and, consequently, that the foundation of empirical knowledge is also provided; 
instead, it shows  
 
that the concept [of empirical knowledge, A.N.] is a coherent one and that it is such and 
such as to rule out the possibility that there could be empirical knowledge not implicitly 
of the form ‘such and such a state of affairs belongs to a coherent system of states of af-
fairs of which my perceptual experiences are a part’ (KTE, 271).16 
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At the heart of the argument there is a purely epistemological issue and, in Sellars’s opin-
ion, the nearest ancestor of this view was Leibniz himself, with his theory of God’s continuous 
representation of all possible worlds (KPT, 22). The main point is that, since Kant says that one 
cannot refer to “things” outside the realm of representations (the “in itself” of a thing is not rep-
resentable, not even by analogy), the result is that the notion of truth is construed from inside the 
notion of representability. The next step, in fact, is that such a domain of representables becomes 
“the domain of items which are candidates for being transcendent objects” (KPT, 23-24).17 This 
is a truly fundamental remark because it implies that the transcendent domain of things is con-
strued on the basis of an epistemic shift: a particular class of well–cohering representeds almost 
unwittingly becomes a class of transcendent items that, from that point on, will be regarded as 
part of a mind–independent world. As Sellars sees it, the point is that what we usually call an 
“actual state of affairs” is effectively “a conceptual response” endowed with an internal “judg-
mental form”. So much so that: 
 
“comparing a judging with a state of affairs” could only be comparing a judging with an-
other judging of the same specific kind, and this would no more be a verification than 
would checking one copy of today’s Times by reading another (KTE, 275).18 
 
The whole business implicit in the lexicon of “correspondence” is therefore highly meta-
phorical: this is the final destination of Sellars’s conceptual–historical analysis. Kant was an ide-
alist with respect to the world of appearances, in the sense that he simply denied that anything in 
space and time could have any form of being other than a second–class one (KPT, 25). Yet, truth 
statements involve something more to be defined: they demand the presence of a small group of 
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available representable contents that “cohere in a certain way”.  
 
In a curious sense, they are the actual, or true, ones, but, for Kant, they are not true in any 
“correspondence” sense. They are just privileged ones which must be there if the notion of 
truth is to make sense. So, Kant is not trying to prove that there is truth, that there is 
knowledge or that there are objects: he is explicating the very concept of an objectively 
true experience (KTE, 275). 
 
In Kant we find a notion of truth that partly corresponds to the realistic insights of the Ear-
ly Modern age. The very notion of “privileged content” somehow replaces the old metaphysical 
facts of the space–time world of Descartes or Newton and, as a result, a certain form of realism 
(scientific realism, one might cautiously say) has indeed been effectively achieved, by an internal 
development of the notion of representability itself. Of course, Kant was not a nominalist - and 
this is another, remarkable point (and probably the most crucial) where his and Leibniz’s paths 
cross. In Kant’s theory of truth, Sellars observes, there is “a great deal of weight on coherence”, 
since it is the very concept of coherence that shoulders the whole burden of truthfulness. More 
concretely, in the Analogy of the Experience Kant considers a special sub–class of coherent rep-
resentables as though they were “contents pertaining to the physical world obeying the laws of 
physics” (KPT, 141). This is the decisive epistemic step: such representables have a “physical 
lawfulness” in the technical sense that they owe this kind of coherence to the properties studied 
by mechanics in the physics of the time. But this also shows how Kant was constructing a sort of 
scientific realism, though its meaning had been dramatically reshaped by comparison with the 
naive realism of Early Modern times. In other words, Kant gave a new shape to the traditional 
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issue of the primary qualities of bodies, partly by excluding the world of secondary qualities (e.g. 
colors) from the range of knowable things (KPT, 45). This move marked a great departure from 
Leibniz, who saw little difference between primary and secondary qualities, given that the latter 
too played an essential role in determining the nature of an individual substance. 
In Leibniz’s nominalist world, as we have seen, there are only representing monadic indi-
viduals, to which relations are reduced. Therefore, unlike Kant, space, time and other sorts of 
relations possess an ontological counterpart that we are able to account for (KPT, 51-53). Leib-
niz’s final theory, in fact, is that our representative knowledge is but the counterpart of the actual 
existence of a large set of compossible substances, whose representation nevertheless is always 
confused, because of the infinite complexity of their nestedness. For Kant, on the other hand, 
representations can hardly be confused, because the very concept of “actual” was deprived of 
any metaphysical sense, and the “in–itself” of things was by no means intended to have an indi-
viduating nature. Kant’s stance is rather transcendental, since it considers the problem of the ob-
jectivity of representations in the epistemic terms of their construability (KPT, 75). Yet, even 
when Kant bids farewell to Leibniz, the theoretical structure of his thought brings him back to 
the latter. According to Sellars, the system of representables draws a sharp distinction between 
what one actually represents and what one would represent “if” she found herself in a potentially 
different situation. In other words, it sets up a distinction between “actual” and “possible” expe-
riences. 
Indeed, the whole matter of coherence generates a modal issue, since it does not simply re-
fer to some aseptic content but always presupposes the possession of some scientific perspective. 
If we consider the history of physics, for example, the objective existence of any coherent con-
tent is unavoidably consistent with a certain blend of variable perspectives that imply paradigm 
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shifts, new discoveries, scientific progress, and so on. The privileged representables are hence by 
Sellars called “iffy” representables, in the sense that they are available from a certain perspec-
tive, like the current scientific image of the world, but are not eternal like a Platonic idea. Ac-
knowledging this therefore involves the possibility of other different perspectives, so much so 
that the whole system of coherence must be “temporalized” (KPT, 141). In short, the law–like 
problem of Kant’s physical world comes face to face with Leibniz’s modal question concerning 
the nomological legitimacy of other possible worlds (KPT, 141). According to Sellars, this topic 
is only hinted at in Kant’s works, and that is why “the small clues that Kant throws out when he 
is discussing possible experiences” are so baffling (KPT, 141). This final comment thus gives us 
a chance to return to Leibniz for the last time. 
 
6. 
In Leibniz we investigated the idea of an individual substance conceived as a set of repre-
sentative episodes; we explored the idea that this would correspond to a timeless class of events; 
we then faced the question “what does it mean to be a fact?”,  reporting Sellars’s claim that a fact 
is simply a true statement in our language. The reference to Kant allowed us to clarify the pro-
found nature of facts: they are subclasses of coherent statements in our language, namely a “con-
ceptual response”. This is true for Leibniz too, even if in his case the situation is possibly more 
complicated, given the difference between our language and God’s. In Leibniz we also find a 
seemingly verificationist approach, which is however internally undermined, since the world of 
timeless facts is but a world of true statements. A first consequence of this is that the concept of 
nature can be formulated in such a way that it requires no use of facts. Sellars notes that when we 
assert something as: 
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The statement “S1 will be f3 in 1959” is true because it is a fact that S1 will be f3 in 1959 
(ML, 167). 
 
the proper “because statement” can be formulated differently as: 
 
The statement “S1 will be f3 in 1959” is true because S1 will be f3 in 1959. 
 
This is the “promissory note character” of Leibniz’s notion of nature, which “requires no 
ontology of facts” because it carries in itself “a pervasive feature of the statements we are in a 
position to make about the world” (ML, 167). Truth has to do with an internal development of 
the metaphysical nature of substances and - insofar as they are all distinguishable, and therefore 
nameable - the next step is to disambiguate the role played by proper names in the structure of 
God’s language. We have already discussed the distinction between our language and the divine’s 
language, but now we need to put it under pressure, since it is through the latter that proper 
names were originally chosen.  
 
7. 
Opening this new line of inquiry, Sellars makes the point that although proper names are 
essentially related to “definite descriptions” or “demonstratives”, they are actually reducible to 
neither (ML, 168). The use of demonstratives assumes that the speaker locates herself in a shared 
world of space–time objects, but this can only be accomplished by referring to names and defi-
nite descriptions of enduring things and it therefore demands the ability “to recognize a named or 
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described object as this object”. The first provisional conclusion is, thus, that a mutual relation-
ship exists between demonstratives and descriptions (ML, 168). The issue is subtler and intri-
guing, however: 
 
“Granted that names are an irreducible mode of reference, what are the implications of the 
idea that every individual thing is nameable?” For if anything is a central fact in Leib-
nitz’s metaphysics, it is that he clearly assumes that every substance is nameable, and I 
believe that the recognition of this fact throws a flood of light on his system (ML, 169). 
 
Names are allegedly an irreducible mode of reference and the “Principle of Nameability” 
says that every individual substance is different, reminding us of the principle of indiscernibles. 
Yet, the question is: what kind of substances are we referring to? Are we dealing with real or 
possible individuals? Strictly speaking, the proper name is a criterion that distinguishes its nomi-
natum from all other individuals. But while we tend to think that the individual concept specifies 
only a few facts about the nominatum, Leibniz believes that the individual concept specifies eve-
rything the nominatum does or experiences throughout its career (ML, 170). Once again, Leibniz 
is concerned with God’s sense of names. If we assume that God can nominate every logically 
possible substance (not only actual ones), it follows that we might wonder whether the possible 
coincides with the nameable, or whether the former are broader in extent than the latter (ML, 
171). The question is striking, given that Leibniz distinguishes the concept of possibility from the 
more restrictive one of compossibility. In Leibniz’s scheme of things, being possible is not 
enough to ensure actual being, since every possible individual must also prove to be compatible 
with a number of other individuals. Hence the problem is to understand to which of the following 
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two cases the nameability will belong: 
 
1) if nameability coincides with logical possibility, then the individual concept must pro-
vide a complete description of its nominatum, so that it can be distinguished from any other indi-
vidual (whether it exists or not); 
2) if nameability is conceived in the more restrictive sense of compossibility, the individual 
concept will provide a sufficient, though incomplete description of its nominatum. In this case, 
the distinguishability of substances would not be completely internal, but would follow from the 
“distinguishability of the worlds” (ML, 171-172). 
 
Sellars suggests that Leibniz opted for the latter solution and, in so doing, he undercut his 
requirement that “the individual concept selects a substance in terms of a complete description”. 
But what is at stake behind the nameability of a possible substance? To find out, we have to 
change our approach. As Sellars says, we have to consider that the primary sense of “possible” in 
Leibniz resembles a “state of affairs”, like when we say: 
 
It is possible that Tom will get well (ML, 172). 
 
One could say that such a claim naturally presupposes the actual existence of an individual, 
namely a person called Tom. Yet, this objection is not as sound as it seems, however, since we 
may well ask: “How can one properly argue that there are no possible things on the ground that 
possible states of affairs concern actual things?” (ML, 172). We might actually accept the idea 
that a “derivative use” of possible can be introduced, as in: 
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There is a possible man in the corner = It is possible that there is a man in the corner (ML, 
173). 
 
Basically, the idea is that we can refer to possible things because of the possibility of pro-
ducing true statements in our language. So, when we say “it is possible that Tom will get well” or 
“it is possible that there is a man in the corner”, the common ground is that they are both used to 
produce true statements. The way in which Leibniz approached this modal topic thus has to do 
with the possibility of constructing true linguistic statements: the idea is that God needs possible 
worlds in order to build true statements, and thereby produces an actual world. In Sellars’s view, 
the final page of the story consists in intending the possibles as part of a process that imply the 
creation of an actual world, according to the model of a fictional speech. Here is the passage: 
 
What I am suggesting is that at the back of Leibnitz’ mind is the picture of God as making 
use, within the fictional rubric, of alternative languages, and by so doing conceiving of al-
ternative sets of individual substances (ML, 180). 
 
and the conclusion: 
 
According to this picture, the model for creation is obviously the removing of the fiction-
al rubric from one of these languages; the move, on God’s part, from “Suppose that there 
were such and such things” to “There are such and such things,” via “Let there be such 
and such things” (ML, 180). 
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The actual world takes shape as the result of a functional process in which fictional degrees 
(possible–but–not–actual statements) gradually decrease until a complete individual has been 
produced. To create means to declassify the fictionality of a language. Needless to say, the very 
possibility of a fictional discourse presupposes some sense of actuality, just as a Dickens has to 
exist prior to an Oliver Twist. But Leibniz seems to extend this dimension of possibility even to 
God, given that on his account God is an entity that necessarily exists but only if it is possible 
(ML, 181). This is the last metaphysical step that Sellars develops in his Meditations. The Divine 
Understanding is the locus of possibles, namely the place where a creative process occurs and 
different alternatives are taking shape. This also explains why the final output (the actual world) 
remains contingent, since the very fact of being created brings with it a whole bundle of not–
actuated possibilities that contribute to defining how the process is accomplished.19 
The matter could even be approached in reverse: we might say that possible substances are 
a prerequisite in the process, since God is but the thought of possibilities. In that case, the con-
clusion is that, while defining the nature of His possible characteristics, God also defines Him-
self. In defining the nature of the individuals that will populate the world, God also defines the 
actuality of His own language. Sellars, thus, paradoxically concludes his essay on Leibniz by 
saying that it is through us and our present existence that God discovers Himself: “If my positive 
argument is correct, the actuality of God, as of anything else, would presuppose our existence as 
discoverers of God (ML, 181)”. It is as if God were like the mind of a novelist lighting up when 
facing the possibility of giving life to some possible characters in a coherent novel. Such activity 
gradually takes more definite shape and finally gives names to its creatures. By naming them, 
God also names Himself as their author - adding His signature, as it were, to His own creation.20 
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Conclusion 
The analysis conducted so far has attempted to retrace the main lines along which Sellars 
interpreted Leibniz. It is now time to look at how and, above all, from what standpoint his inter-
pretation should be assessed. This is no easy task, and the reader will have realized that we have 
largely avoided introducing interpretative issues so as not to complicate matters even further. 
However, if we were to adopt the criteria of a historiographic assessment, then we should also 
acknowledge that Sellars: 
 
- refers very little to direct sources (he almost exclusively cites the Discourse on Metaphysics, 
with a few indirect references to the New Essays and Monadology, at most); 
- refers very little to any critical literature (only mentioning Russell and Broad, while the works 
of Couturat, for example, which also marked a decisive turning point in Leibniz studies, are nev-
er named); 
- sometimes comes up with philologically inaccurate claims (the doctrine of relationships is not 
as Sellars presents it; the notion of complete concept is not so unequivocal; and the question of 
representational solipsism is less straightforward than it appears); 
- employs decontextualized analytical tools (the whole issue of proper names and the reference to 
particulars are things that do not belong to Leibniz’s apparatus); 
- sometimes advances arguments that are not reflected in the texts (such as the way in which God 
conceives creation, and ML's final arguments). 
 
Even so, there are just as many important elements to consider. Adopting broader filters in 
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our assessment, we realize that Sellars: 
 
- clearly grasps some of the most insightful and crucial points of Leibniz’s thought: the internal 
pressure between a ‘thing–nature framework’ and a ‘law–event framework’ is a core feature of 
his historically–shaped philosophy on which contemporary interpreters largely agree (Di Bella 
2005); the doctrine of relationships, though internally more complex, is certainly a fundamental 
part of his thought (Mugnai 1992); and the theme of heritage of topics from Leibniz in Kant is 
equally crucial and surprisingly topical (Look, in press); 
- also construes part of his own philosophical strategy in terms of a comparison with Leibniz: the 
idea of ‘fact’ as ‘true statement in our language’ (SM, 116; ML, 167), and the idea that relation-
ships can be transformed into categorical facts (ML, 162) are just two of the most striking exam-
ples of this. 
 
We can thus arrive at some general considerations about how Sellars saw the relationship 
between philosophy and the history of philosophy. It could be said that he espouses a holistic 
conception of the history of philosophy. To paraphrase the myth of the genius Jones, we might 
say that, as private speeches are forged from public language, so too can ‘private’ philosophical 
insights be framed solely on the grounds of an internalization of public (historically produced) 
philosophy. From this point of view, the idea of the history of philosophy as the lingua franca of 
thought would be a matter not only of mere communication, but also of the production of ideas. 
It is true that Sellars's reconstructions are very often ideal–typical rather than historical, but it is 
also true that he was working at a time when specialization had yet to produce its disruptive ef-
fects. The subsequent fortunes of the historiography on Leibniz help us to understand this point: 
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up until the Sixties, works published on Leibniz were relatively few and often unsatisfactory. But 
the decades that followed saw an exponential increase in intensity of critical debates, due to the 
parallel activities and publications produced by the Leibniz–Archiv (1962), the international 
Leibniz–Kongressen (from 1966 onwards), and the Studia Leibnitiana review (1969). After their 
arrival on the scene, most previous studies suddenly became obsolete. Sellars was a true precur-
sor from this point of view because, despite all his philological limitations, his approach was new 
in the analytical world. Through his ideas on the relationship between philosophy and the history 
of philosophy, he generated something that simply had not been done before, starting a trend that 
is still of great interest today: the idea that philosophy is both a theoretical and, at the same time, 
an intrinsically historical discipline. This is a notion that, in some respects, it would be interest-
ing to apply to the contemporary metaphilosophical debate. 
 
 
Notes 
1 Sellars attributes to Russell a crucial mediating role, both in terms of his analytical interpretation of 
Leibniz (Russell, 1900) and his reflection on particulars and proper names (Russell 1910; 1911; 1940). 
He can thus be seen as the trait–d’union between Leibniz’s two lines of inquiry discussed here. 
2 The first references to Leibniz can be found in his MA thesis in Buffalo (Substance, Change and Event, 
1934), in which he read Leibniz through the lens of Russell’s interpretation. There are some lecture 
notes too, presumably written by Sellars at Oxford (1934-1936), while attending a course on Leibniz 
held by J.L. Austin (“Austin – Leibniz”, undated, in Wilfrid S. Sellars Papers, 1899-1990, ASP.1991.01, 
Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh, Box 7, 
Folder 23). 
3 Sure enough, the principle of reason refers to the idea that the whole series of episodes is grounded in 
something that is not episodic but self–subsistent: God. 
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4 In his essay on Berkeley and Descartes (BD, 363), Sellars traces such a distinction by referring to the 
Appendix of the second set of Objections and Replies to Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy. 
The distinction also has an important role in SM 31. A careful analysis focused on the subtle, yet deci-
sive, distinctions among the Cartesian’s notions of “formal reality”, “objective reality” and “material 
falsity” of ideas is developed in Moran (2014), pp. 67-92. 
5 “There is no motion when there is no change that can be observed. And where there is no change that 
can be observed, there is no change at all” (Leibniz 1989, 340). This quotation was not produced by 
Sellars himself: I report it here for the sake of clarity. 
6 “So it is obvious that unless there were change in simple things, there would be no change in things at 
all. Indeed, not even change can come from without, since, on the contrary, an internal tendency to 
change is essential to finite substance, and change could not arise naturally in monads in any other way” 
(Leibniz 1989, 177). Here again, I refer to quotations that might help to clarify the metaphysical mean-
ing of Leibniz’s nominalism. For more historical details, and to see how Leibniz managed to combine 
idealism, nominalism and phenomenalism, see Adams (1994). 
7  On the different models of Leibniz’s conception of “nestedness”, see Nachtomy (2006), 225-226. 
8 “There is a continuum of beyondness which corresponds to the continuum of mediacy of representing”. 
Sellars plays here with the “direction” of spatial continuity and the continuity of the “indirectness” of 
the representation. It is perfectly clear, he adds, “that you can map a spatial continuum (supposing that 
there is such a thing) into a continuum of indirectness of representation”: Leibniz gives us “a 
metaphysical model for geometry” (KPT, 256). 
9 The idea that there might be something actual corresponding to the representation of S1 pertains to the 
nature of divine decrees, since it refers to God’s decision to create both terms. Some scholars have right-
ly pointed out that “analytically deriving the existence of other individuals or external objects from the 
concept of perception is totally misleading”. What we can say is that “the perceptual nature of all sub-
stantial states brings it about that a certain series of internal (we would say ‘intentional’) objects is part 
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of the individual’s essence”. Paris’s love for Helen “does not properly end with Helen, to be sure, hence 
it does not necessarily imply Helen’s existence in flesh and blood ‘out there in the world’; it is directed, 
however, towards a certain representational object” (Di Bella 2005, 345-346). 
10 An interesting question is whether it was Leibniz who influenced Sellars on this topic or, vice versa, 
whether Sellars’s theoretical tools allowed him to interpret Leibniz in this way. 
11 For the distinction between rules of criticism (ought–to–be) and rules of action (ought–to–do), see LTC, 
507-508; DeVries (2005) 43-46; O’Shea (2007), 79-83. 
12 According to Sellars, in Early Modern epistemology (Kant included) we find no clear–cut distinction 
between representation as a “representing act” and representation as a “represented object” (KTE 269; 
KPT 27; SM 36). 
13 The idea that the act–content model is a false relational model, and that this kind of model provides the 
conceptual key to understanding the epistemology of modern thought, was developed by Sellars right at 
the start of his lectures on Kant (KPT, 8-9). 
14  According to Henry Allison, “the defining characteristic of transcendental realism is its confusion of 
appearances, or ‘mere representations’, with things in themselves”. It was only Kant’s critical philoso-
phy that succeeded in clarifying this distinction (Allison 2004, 22-23). 
15 The argument is also developed in KTE, 269. 
16 “The core of Kant’s epistemological turn is the claim that the distinction between epistemic and onto-
logical categories is an illusion. All so–called ontological categories are in fact epistemic” (KTE, 270). 
17 According to Kant, cognitive content can exist only as represented, or as representable, not in an abso-
lute sense - as a pure realist would have it. 
18 Here the quotation resembles Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations § 265. As Sellars points out in 
KTE, “Kant’s agnosticism, however, if taken seriously - i.e., construed as the view that we have no de-
terminate concepts of how things are in themselves - means that no conceptual response can be evalu-
ated, in the above manner, as correct or incorrect. Rules of the form «(Ceteris paribus) one ought to 
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respond to  items with conceptual acts of kind C» could never be rules in accordance with which 
people criticize conceptual responses; for, in his official view, the esse of any item to which any empir-
ical predicate applies is already to be a conceptual response, not something that is responded to” 
(KTE, 282). For an analysis of what is involved here for Sellars’s idea of Kant, see O’Shea 2007, 134-
136. 
19 Piro (2005) remarks that every event is the bearer of a not–actuated bundle of possibilities. Each event 
becomes “actual” precisely by virtue of this bundle of not–actuated possibilities. See Piro (2005), 540-
542. 
20 Interestingly enough, the conclusion was rather different and, to my mind, less radical in an earlier ver-
sion of the paper. Here, in fact, Sellars concluded his analysis by saying: “If, then, our promissory note 
– which can be abbreviated, with proper precautions into the claim that facts are true statements, and 
categories of fact, categories of true statement – if our promissory note can be cashed, our discussion 
will have achieved two purposes: (1) It will have exhibited the basic role which an unformulated in re 
conception of truths or facts played in rationalistic thinking; (2) It will have served to indicate the radi-
cal character of the measures which must be taken if the many important insights contained in rational-
istic systems are to be translated into contemporary terms.” (Leibnitz Rationalism: Scaffolding for a 
Reconstruction (Part I), undated, in Wilfrid S. Sellars Papers, 1899-1990, ASP.1991.01, Archives of 
Scientific Philosophy, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh, Box 33, Folder 9, 17) 
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